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Contesting Hybridity: Evangelistas and 
Kataristas in Highland Bolivia* 
ANDREW CANESSA 
Abstract. Two of the most striking aspects of social change in recent decades in 
Latin America have been the rise of indigenist movements and the spread of 
evangelical Protestantism. To date they have been analysed separately, but this 
article shows that a comparison of the two in the context of Bolivia can prove 
highly productive. Although in many respects evangelismo and katarismo are 
diametrically opposed, there are some striking similarities. They draw their 
adherents from the same social base, undermine the notion of a homogeneous 
nation-state and also clearly reject the position of cultural mestiqaje at the root of 
Bolivian state ideology. Thus, at a time when 'hybridised' cultural forms are 
supposed to be becoming more common in Latin America and around the world, 
these two social movements explicitly contest hybridity. 
Introduction 
Two of the most striking aspects of social change in recent decades in 
Latin America have been the rise of indigenist movements and the spread 
of evangelical Protestantism. During the past decade indigenous groups 
have been organising and struggling for their rights, from the Zapatistas 
in Mexico to the Mapuche in Chile. Commentators have noted that 'The 
Indian' is returning to public consciousness in Latin America after 
centuries during which his disappearance has been predicted.1 The 
project of creating homogenous nation-states in Latin America composed 
of a hybridised mestizo 'raza c6smica' is being seriously challenged by 
such movements. It is becoming increasingly clear that these indigenous 
groups, what Bonfil has described as 'nations in potential', are beginning 
to realise a very different vision of the contemporary nation-state.2 No less 
dramatic, and equally challenging to Latin Americans' sense of national 
Andrew Canessa is a lecturer in the Department of Sociology at the University of 
Essex. 
* A version of this paper was presented at the Society of Latin American Studies 
Conference in St Andrews in the Spring of 1997. I am grateful to Jane Hindley, Valerie 
Fraser, Mike Roper and Juliana Strobele-Gregor for comments on earlier drafts as well 
as the helpful suggestions of two anonymous reviewers. Any errors are, of course, my 
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1Xavier Alb6, 'El Retorno del Indio', Revista Andina, vol. I, no. 2 (1991), pp. 299-345; 
Phillip Wearne, The Return of the Indian (London, I996). 
2 Guillermo Bonfil (ed.), Utopiay revolucidn. Elpensamiento politico contempordneo de los indios 
en America Latina (Mexico, 1981), p. 30. 
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identity, is the phenomenal expansion of evangelical Protestant groups 
across the continent.3 The successful state religion of Catholicism no 
longer provides a unifying symbol of nationhood, and is being challenged 
on many different fronts, not least from within. Notable among these are 
the Protestant evangelical churches that have spread rapidly all over the 
region, and are particularly prominent in Guatemala, Brazil, Bolivia, El 
Salvador and Chile, among others. 
At first glance, these two social phenomena seem to be entirely distinct, 
and have generally been treated as such. Whereas indigenous nationalism 
may seem to fall naturally under the rubric of 'new' social movements or 
within the rapidly-expanding literature on new nationalisms, the study of 
evangelical Protestantism has been assigned to an entirely different realm.4 
Indeed, whereas Christian Base Communities and liberation theology are 
sometimes examined in terms of new social movements,5 the evangelicals 
are generally seen as being antithetical to the idea of a social movement, 
since they are widely considered to be politically conservative. It is not, 
however, a basic criterion of social movements that they be progressive 
and left-wing.6 'New' social movements are characterised by their 
departure from class-based politics and a tendency to be more narrowly 
focused. Evangelical Protestant groups are not consciously organised 
around a political goal, but they do mobilise a large number of people 
around a particular end, and have as their goal a radical change of society. 
Although their aims may not be overtly political, their mobilisation has 
significant political consequences, as we shall see below. The exclusion of 
evangelical Protestant groups from the literature of new social movements 
may thus owe more to analysts' own subjective preferences and prejudices 
than to any intrinsic difficulty in applying the theoretical framework of 
social movements to evangelical groups. The principal aim of this article 
is not, however, to demand that evangelical Protestantism be incorporated 
into new social movement theory (although this may be seen as a small 
step in that direction), but rather to provide an analysis which allows for 
a productive comparison of evangelical Protestantism and indigenous 
nationalism. 
This article examines evangelical Protestantism and indigenous 
nationalism in highland Bolivia. It will be shown that while they have 
contrasting, and even contradictory, views of 'traditional' native culture, 
modernisation and religion, they both, nevertheless, provide coherent 
3 David Stoll, Is Latin America turning Protestant? The Politics of Evangelical Growth 
(Berkeley, 1990), David Martin, Tongues of Fire: The Explosion of Protestantism in Latin 
America (Oxford, I990). 
Peter Wade, Race and Ethnicity in Latin America (London, I997). 5 Joe Foweraker, Theorising Social Movements. (London, i995). 6 Ibid., p. 3. 
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critiques of a racially and culturally mixed mestizo state. That is, they both 
explicitly and fervently reject the kind of cultural mixing that has been 
state ideology in the past,7 and which in recent years has been seen as a 
central feature of cultures in Latin America,8 along with other parts of the 
world at the periphery of global capitalism.9 Or, to put it another way, 
instead of the multiplicity of identities, the fluidity of boundaries and 
cultural 'hybridisation'10 or 'creolisation'11 which the prophets of 
postmodernity would have us believe is spreading inexorably around the 
world, significant groups in highland Bolivia are explicitly contesting 
these new cultural forms. They are, of course, 'hybrid' forms themselves 
(indeed, one could not imagine how they would be anything else),12 and 
may be considered to be products of the globalisation of culture and 
capital, even though their adherents would reject this description. The 
central point, however, is that both of these movements insist on clear 
categories of identity and conspicuously challenge the kind of'established' 
hybridity and normative models of mestiZaje that have been promoted in 
Latin America. 
There is something of an irony here, for cultural mixing has of course 
been happening in Latin America from the very day the Europeans 
arrived. In the areas of religion and art new 'hybrid' forms were created 
almost immediately,13 and the same is true for every other aspect of social 
life and production. In many countries, such as Mexico, Peru and Bolivia, 
hybridity in this sense has been the norm for at least the past five centuries, 
and has shaped state ideology for much of the present one. It appears that 
just as some scholars have discovered cultural synthesis and fusion, 
substantial groups of people are rejecting it. 
One aspect of contemporary notions of hybridity is the spatial or 
cultural displacement of significant proportions of the population as 
communities and individuals migrate and create new 'hybrid' cultural 
7 Mexico after the Revolution is perhaps the most striking example of this; see, for 
example, Jane Hindley, 'Towards a Pluricultural Nation: The Limits of Indigenismo and 
Article 4', in Rob Aitken et al. (eds.) Dismantling the Mexican State (New York, 1996). 
Other countries, however, soon followed suit, including Bolivia. 
8 N6stor Garcia Canclini, Transforming Modernity: Popular Culture in Mexico (Austin, 
1993); Roberto Schwarz, Misplaced Ideas: Essays on Brazilian Culture, edited and with an 
introduction by John Gledson (London, i992), pp. i-i8. 
9 Ulf Hannerz, Cultural Complexity: Studies in the Social Organisation of Meaning (New 
York, 1992). 
10 Nestor Garci Canclini, Culturas hibridas: estrategias para entrar y salir de la modernidad 
(Mexico, 1990). 11 Ulf Hannerz, Cultural Complexity. 
12 The idea of cultural hybridity implicitly depends on an idea of cultures which are not 
hybrids but any culture borrows and reinterprets elements as it goes through history. 
This process may be faster or slower, more or less visible, but it is surely universal. 
13 See, for example, Sabine MacCormack, Religion of the Andes (Princeton, 199I) and 
Teresa Gisbert, Iconografiay mitos indigenas en el arte (La Paz, i980). 
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forms. In the Central Andes, however, this is hardly a recent phenomenon. 
For at least the last two millennia people have been moving for economic, 
religious or political reasons. The city of Cuzco under the Inkas was a 
most cosmopolitan place, and in their Empire tens of thousands of people 
regularly moved hundreds of miles to pay tribute in mines and cities, or 
to colonise on behalf of the state. Indeed one of the characteristic patterns 
of Andean settlement is the archipelago,14 which created a patchwork of 
ethnicities and languages. 
This pattern of largely economic and political migration continued in 
the colonial period as people settled in towns forming an urban cholo class 
while retaining cultural and economic links with their kin in the 
countryside. In the words of Gruzinski and Wachtel, 'the Andean 
world ... was, from the sixteenth century on, a theatre of multiple cultural 
confrontations, of intermixings, migrations, and interbreeding that 
engendered new collective identities'.15 In twentieth century Bolivia this 
is evidenced in the case of cities such as La Paz as well as Cochabamba, 
Oruro, Potosi and others.16 Harris and Alb6 have demonstrated the 
important connections between indigenous miners and peasants in the 
Norte de Potosi up to the present day, where modern forms of industrial 
relationship not only co-exist with but also depend upon more 
'traditional' economic and social structures.17 Others have noted that 
indian identity can only be seen as a product of an historical relationship 
with metropolitan Bolivian culture,18 which, in turn, is produced through 
its contrastive relationship with 'the indian'.l1 In all these and myriad 
14 J. Murra, 'El "Control Vertical" de un Maximo de Pisos Ecologicos en la Economia 
de las Sociedades Andinas', in J. Murra (ed.), Visita de la Provincia de Ledn de Huanuco 
[IJ62]. Inigo Ortii de Ziuniga, Visitador, Vol. II (Huanuco, 1972), pp. 429-76. 
15 Serge Gruzinski & Nathan Wachtel, 'Cultural interbreedings: Constituting the 
Majority as a Minority', Comparative Study of Society and History, vol. 37 (I997), p. 240. 
16 X. Alb6, T. Greaves and G. Sandoval, Chuk4yawu: La Cara Aymara de La Pat, vols 
I-IV (La Paz, 1981, I982, I983, I987). 
17 Olivia Harris and Xavier Alb6, Monterasj guardatojos: Campesinosy mineros en el Norte 
de Potosi (La Paz, 1975). 
18 I prefer the term 'indian' over 'indigenous'. 'Indigenous' is drawn from natural 
history and means 'belonging naturally to the region'. There is a certain absurdity in 
talking of indigeneity in the Andes since the vast majority of Andeans have some 
descent from the people the conquistadors met. Indigenous also implies being of'pure' 
native descent. One would need to include millions of such people who do not see 
themselves as indigenous nor are seen by others as indigenous and thus the term has 
limited analytical purchase. 'Indian' on the other hand, in the American context, more 
clearly indicates a culturally constructed identity. In the American context, 'indian' is 
an ethnic, not national term, and therefore I follow the usage of writing this word in 
lower case in the same way as other such categories, e.g. mestizo, black, mulatto. 
See Peter Wade, Race and Ethnicity, p. I21. 
19 Thomas Abercrombie, 'To be Indian to be Bolivian', in Nation States and Indians in 
Latin America, G. Urban and J. Scherzer (eds.) (Austin, 199I), pp. 95-130. 
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other circumstances, people and their cultures clashed, merged, fused, 
synthesised and, naturally, hybridised. We would thus expect the northern 
highlands of Bolivia, a metropolis surrounded by an Aymara-speaking 
peasant hinterland,20 to provide good examples of hybrid cultural forms, 
examples of'a theatre of multiple cultural confrontations', and this area 
does indeed provide many such. 
The Aymara-speaking migrants to the city of La Paz and their 
descendants, or their kin in provincial towns with easy access to the 
metropolis, can be described as 'deterritorialised' 21 a term which not only 
refers to being displaced from a point of origin, as in the case with 
migrants to cities, but also to 'a "liberation" from cultural rootedness and 
filiation'.22 It is precisely such a group where one might suppose to find 
cultural hybridity, where 'identities are formed out of "inbetweenness"; 
and differences are not necessarily between nations, ethnic and linguistic 
groups, but rather are stylistic, and express the self-fashioning of sub- 
groups and inflection onto the generic international media culture'.23 
Indeed, in these highlands we find the very kinds of cultural forms which 
typify what is presented as hybrid culture in Latin America: the ceramics 
and artesanza echoing 'traditional' themes but clearly removed from them; 
practices which once had spiritual meaning now reproduced as folklore ;24 
deities such as the Pachamama earth goddess reincarnated as the mother of 
all Bolivians celebrated in the in-flight magazine of the national airline.25 
It is equally clear, however, that not all 'deterritorialised' people in 
highland Bolivia embrace and generate hybrid cultural forms in the same 
way. By focusing on material culture, commentators have failed to notice 
that other members of this group explicitly reject hybrid forms of culture 
as being degenerate. The argument here is not that they are somehow 
'untainted' by contemporary forms of popular culture, but rather that 
they consciously attempt to resist the merging of cultural forms. Most 
importantly, this resistance is located, not in the area of material culture 
and performance art, but in the less concrete realm of religion and ethnic 
identity. Here identities are not formed out of 'in-betweenness' since 'in- 
20 The author conducted anthropological research among Aymara-speakers in the 
northern highlands of Bolivia in I989-1992, 1993 and 1998. 21 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guatarri, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (New 
York, 1971); Jean Franco, 'Globalization and the Crisis of the Popular', in Tom 
Salman (ed.), The Legacy of the Disinherited. Popular Culture in Latin America: Modernity, 
Globalization, Hybridity and Authenticity (Amsterdam, I996), pp. 264-5, William Rowe 
and Vivian Schelling, Memory and Modernity: Popular Culture in Latin America (London, 
1991), p. 231. 
22 Jean Franco, 'Globalization and the Crisis of the Popular', p. 265. 23 Ibid. 
24 See William Rowe and Vivian Schelling, Memory and Modernity. 
25 Olivia Harris, 'La Pachamama: significados de la madre en el discurso boliviano', in 
Latinoamericanas: DieT ensayos en una historia colectiva (Lima, I988), pp. 7-75. 
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betweenness' is precisely what is rejected; and not only is difference 
constructed as being rather more than stylistic but is rooted in the 
unfashionable essentialisms of nation, race, ethnicity and religion.26 What 
is worthy of note here is not that one can find forms of hybridity, which 
is in any case to be expected, but that certain historical forms of hybridity 
are being rejected. 
There are also those highland indians who are less 'deterritorialised', 
with cohesive and functioning communities that continue to organise on 
a 'traditional' basis. These groups, however, are much less concerned 
with defining clearly a national identity or religious orthodoxy. The 
apparent paradox is that in the northern highlands it is those who might 
be termed 'traditionalists' who continue to feel most comfortable with 
synthetic religious practices, assimilationist cultural ideologies and whose 
sense of identity is founded on relative and shifting categories;27 it is 
amongst those who are at the forefront of modernisation that we find 
groups who denounce syncretism, reject cultural (and racial) mestizaje, and 
hold true to essentialist categories of identity. 
It is in the metropolitan areas of the northern highlands of Bolivia 
where the most clearly-articulated rejection of standard forms of hybridity 
is to be found. The northern highlights of the department of La Paz is, in 
Bolivian terms, a densely-populated area and includes the capital city. The 
population is predominantly rural and largely Aymara-speaking. Even the 
capital city includes several hundred thousand Aymara-speakers. The 
region also includes the ruins of the capital of the Tiwanaku civilisation, 
which is now seen by many as the original site of the Aymara nation.28 
This area holds over a third of Bolivia's Protestants and it is also the area 
where indigenous nationalism has the largest number of supporters. 
Obviously, such nationalism is concentrated among indian groups, but so 
too is Protestantism. 
How then to account for the rise of these kinds of movements in the 
northern highlands in recent years? It is quite common to see both as 
having something to do with (post)modernity and changing economic 
26 See Jean Franco, 'Globalization and the Crisis of the Popular'. In this they may be 
considered to be two more examples around the world of 'new' nationalisms and 
fundamentalist religions. Whereas it is perhaps more common for fundamental religion 
and resurgent nationalism to be closely allied in examples from the USA, India, Iran, 
Pakistan, etc., in Bolivia the 'new' nationalism of the kataristas and the fundamentalism 
of the evangelistas share a mutual antipathy. 
27 Andrew Canessa, 'Procreation, Personhood and Ethnic Difference in Highland 
Bolivia', Ethnos, vol. 63, no. 2 (I998), pp. 227-47. 
28 There is, however, no indication that Tiwanaku was anything like an Aymara nation 
although it is quite likely that at least some of its residents spoke Aymara. There is also 
considerable evidence that they may also have spoken Pukina and, in any case, 
Tiwanaku had important cultural links with Wari which is now situated in Peru. 
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and political structure, where conditions that promote diversity deepen.29 
This line of reasoning presents indian nationalism as an example of the 
fracturing of the nation-state as global economies erode the clarity of 
national boundaries and undermine the cohesion of national identity, 
while simultaneously increasing inequalities. These inequalities dis- 
proportionately affect indigenous minorities, as the case of the Zapatistas 
clearly attests. The spread of Protestantism, too, has been seen in the 
context of modernising economies and social structures.30 As old social 
organisations such as the Roman Catholic Church and the hacienda system 
lose their legitimacy, confidence and power, charismatic evangelical 
groups provide a new sense of religiosity and community.31 Similarly, 
with economic changes undermining the collective structures of 
indigenous communities, evangelicals provide a new set of mores and 
practices more appropriate to a market-oriented and individualistic 
economy.32 For example, Protestants' rejection of fiestas and fictive 
kinship, important means of redistributing resources in the community, 
allows individuals to accumulate capital. Similarly, the stress on literacy 
and education provides Protestants with the intellectual capital 
increasingly necessary in the modern world. The response of two sectors 
of what one could term 'deterritorialised indian society' to these new 
challenges could not be more different. Evangelical Protestants, 
evangelistas, reject paganism and many important aspects of'traditional' 
culture; they look towards the West, especially the United States, for 
examples and orientation; and believe in an individualistic ethic rooted in 
a moral community. Kataristas, that is Aymara nationalists, seek to 
revitalise indian culture and religion. They are highly critical of much of 
Western culture which they see as oppressive and imperialist, especially 
that exemplified by the United States; and they believe in a collectivist 
ethic rooted in the indian race and the Aymara nation. At its simplest, 
katarismo represents an attempt to produce a meaningful indigenous 
alternative to the Western model of modernity.33 
Despite these striking contrasts, it is the basic thesis of this article that 
katarismo and evangelical Protestantism are parallel but opposing 
responses to the same social dynamic. We shall now examine the 
29 Michael Kearney, 'Indigenous ethnicity and mobilisation in Latin America' vol. 23, 
no. 2, Latin American Perspectives, (I996), p. 8. 
30 David Martin, Tongues of Fire. 
31 Andrew Canessa, 'Evangelical Protestantism in the Northern Highlands of Bolivia', 
Studies in World Christianity, vol. 4, no. i (1998), pp. 21-4o. 
32 Ted Lewellen, Peasants in Transition: The Changing Economy of the Peruvian Aymara 
(Boulder, 978). 
33 Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, 'Democracia liberal y democracia de ayllu: el caso de Norte 
Potosi, Bolivia', in Carlos Toranzo Roca (ed.), El dificil camino hacia la democracia (La 
Paz, 1990). 
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development of each in turn, particularly in the context of the profound 
social and political changes brought about by the 1952 Revolution in 
Bolivia. 
Katarismo 
The 1952 Revolution is a major landmark in modern Bolivian history. 
Despite providing the clearest expression of the homogenous nation-state 
under an ideology of mestigaje, it opened up the political space for indians 
to organise around a coherent identity. Resentment against the state and 
the status of metropolitan cultural ideology grew as it became apparent to 
indians that they continued to be marginalised and co-opted at best. By the 
1990S indian groups had managed, at quite a profound level, to change the 
cultural ideology of the state, and to open up a more public space for their 
concerns qua indians to be aired. 
In 1952 the land-owning oligarchy of Bolivia was overthrown in a 
revolution, and in the following year the revolutionary government, often 
under pressure, enacted a series of reforms which had far-reaching 
consequences. The Agrarian Reform of 1953, under the motto 'land to 
those who work it' returned land to the peasantry and ended the 
hegemony of the hacienda-owners. Schools were built in virtually every 
village over the next twenty years. Unable to eke a living off the land, 
many indians took advantage of their new freedom to travel, and migrated 
in their tens of thousands to the capital city of La Paz. The spread of 
education and improved communications meant that populations which 
were previously illiterate and monolingual were exposed to a very 
different way of life, one that was preached over the radio and in the 
schools in the middle of their villages. The principal aim behind these 
schools was quite explicitly to create new Bolivians, and to create a new 
homogenous national identity. In many communities, the chapel or 
church maintained by the hacendado fell into disuse and to some extent the 
school replaced it. Where the church had been the means through which 
indians were integrated into colonial and national culture, the school 
would now turn indians into Bolivians through the agency of the 
schoolteacher. 
In this context, the word indio (indian) was legally prohibited and 
replaced in most contexts by campesino (peasant), with the aim of 
obliterating any kind of ethnic and racial difference between Bolivians: it 
was the role of schools to turn indians into mestizos. Thus, as was the case 
with the Mexican Revolution,34 Bolivian nationalist ideology exalted a 
mestizo identity at the expense of an indian one. The new state needed the 
rural masses to lend it legitimacy while, at the same time, it felt the need 
34 Jane Hindley, 'Towards a Pluricultural nation', p. 226. 
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to eradicate the retarding cultural elements of an anachronistic indian 
population.35 Thus indians, to borrow a phrase from Martin Barbero, 
were subject to an 'abstract inclusion but a concrete exclusion',36 all the 
more so since they were no longer supposed to exist, and now only 
received recognition for their colourful folklore. 
A distinct indian identity and culture was actively suppressed during 
this period but, at the same time, it was in the post-revolutionary period 
that Aymara nationalism had its roots. The revolution opened up political 
space (albeit small) for indianist groups by ushering in a period of relative 
democracy and pluralism. This post-Revolutionary period can be seen as 
the first phase of modern indian nationalism. 
More importantly, it effected a massive migration of Aymara-speaking 
indians to the cities, as well as beginning a process of mass education in 
the country. With widespread education and expanding communication, 
indians were being exposed to metropolitan values and structures as never 
before. Not all indians of the period unequivocally embraced the 
assimilationist model, and one of the more articulate responses was from 
the Indian Party of Bolivia (Partido Indio de Bolivia). The PIB ideology 
was strongly anti-Western and anti-Christian, advocating the exter- 
mination of whites and mestizos.37 For two decades after the Revolution, 
the PIB and its energetic leader, Fausto Reinaga, carried the torch of the 
Indianist movement. The movement had very limited success in this 
period because indian communities were successfully co-opted into a 
syndicalist structure38 controlled from the metropolis and later on in a 
pact with the military, the Pacto Militar-Campesino (i966-1979). By the 
middle of the seventies, despite enthusiastically courting the indians for 
political support and conferring on them a central position, as campesinos, 
in political rhetoric, neither the democratic government of the post- 
revolutionary years nor the populist military regimes of the late sixties and 
early seventies had produced much of benefit for rural people. 
By the mid-seventies, the hundreds and thousands of indians who had 
been drawn into metropolitan culture were becoming increasingly aware 
35 Indeed, this problem is not unique to Bolivia, or Latin America for that matter. 
European nations, too, had to deal with the subaltern masses which defined the nation 
and gave it legitimacy while being at the same time considered ignorant, superstitious 
and backward. See Nestor Garcia Canclini, Transforming Modernity. 
36 Jesus Martin Barbero, De los medios a las mediaciones (Mexico 1987) in Nestor Garcia 
Canclini, Culthuas hibridas, p. 194. 
37 Policarpio Rojas Ramirez, Historia de levantamientos indtgenas en Bolivia, 1978-198 (La 
Paz, i989); Fausto Reinaga, La revolucidn india (La Paz, I969). 
38 Indian communities were basically unionised with elected secretary generals, secretaries 
for justice, roads, education and a host of other offices. These were incorporated into 
the national syndicalist structure. Many indian communities continue to organise 
themselves internally along the lines of annual elections to these offices. 
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that, despite the inclusive rhetoric of the state, indians in Bolivia were a 
despised and marginalised people who were victims of systematic 
discrimination. Although the Revolution accorded citizenship to all 
Bolivians, this citizenship was based on the privatisation of communal 
lands, obligatory Spanish, and the disappearance of any vestiges of ethnic 
identity.39 Indians had first to reject their own values, to absorb the 
denigration of their culture, before being accepted as citizens in the nation 
organised hierarchically on a clientelist basis. Some of these migrants and 
second-generation city dwellers began to investigate new forms of 
organisation that rejected the top-down approaches of the past. Moreover, 
they became concerned with issues of ethnic identity and personal dignity 
in the context of the hegemonic mestizo metropolitan culture. 
In 1973 a number of these intellectuals travelled to the archaeological 
ruins of Tiwanaku and presented what is now known as the Tiwanaku 
manifesto, which proposed for the first time an Aymara nation. It was 
highly critical of one of the pillars of the 19 5 2 Revolution, mass education. 
'La escuela no s6lo busca convertir al indio en una especie de mestizo sin 
definici6n, ni personalidad, sino que persigue su asimilacion a la cultura 
occidental y capitalista'40 as one of its lines (in Spanish) reads. The 
manifesto clearly rejected the assimilationist model that had been taken for 
granted by liberal elites since the Revolution and indeed since 
independence from Spain. 
The Tiwanaku Manifesto marked the start of the second phase of indian 
nationalism. Although Fausto Reinaga was recognised as an important 
contributor to indian nationalism, he was rapidly marginalised by the new 
groups congregating around the label, 'katarismo'. Katarismo, though 
claiming roots in the distant past, is also a thoroughly modern 
phenomenon. The word katarismo is used here to describe Aymara- 
oriented nationalist groups because so many of them look for inspiration 
to the figure of Tupaq Katari,41 and regularly refer to themselves as 
39 Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, 'Democracia liberal y democracia de ayllu: el caso de Norte 
de Potosi, Bolivia', in Carlos Toranzo Roca (ed.), El dificil camino hacia la democracia (La 
Paz, 1990), p. 48. 40 P. Rojas Ramirez, Historia de levantamientos, p. 46. 
41 Ejercito Guerrilero Tupac Katari (EGTK), Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Katari 
(MRTK), Movimiento Indio Tupac Katari (MITKA), Movimiento Revolucionario 
Tupac Katari de Liberaci6n (MRTKL), Frente Unico de Liberaci6n Katarista 
(FULKA) and Movimiento Katarista Nacional (MKN), to name the most significant. 
Some, such as the EGTK, are opposed to electoral politics and aim to achieve their 
ends through violent means. Others, such as MRTKL and FULKA, who do not reject 
constitutional means, stand at elections where the results give some measure of their 
support. In the 1988 general elections they were the only indianist parties to stand, and 
respectively won 14,595 and I,002o votes in the Department of La Paz. See Diego 
Pacheco, El indianimsoy los indios contempordneos en Bolivia (La Paz, I992), p. 216. In the 
elections of I993, however, the MRTKL became a coalition partner of the MNR 
(Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario) and together they won the elections which 
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kataristas. Tupaq Katari was the name taken by Julian Apaza, the Aymara- 
speaking leader of the indian rebellion in 1780-83 caused by an increase 
in indian tribute, mita, and repartimiento by the Spanish Crown.42 Unlike 
his counterparts in Peru such as Tupaq Amaru, Tupaq Katari argued for 
the total banishment or elimination of the Colonial powers and proposed 
an indian-led government.43 He is also known for his severe justice when 
it came to dealing with clerics, although he seems to have maintained his 
Christian faith. His anti-clericalism, which included the killing of priests 
and burning of churches is something which contemporary kataristas use 
as examples of his anti-Christian fervour.44 
One of the most salient features of the Katari myth is his demise. After 
two years of successful warfare, including twice laying siege to the city of 
La Paz in 1781, Julian Apaza was captured on 2 November of the same 
year and two days later he was quartered.45 His dying words are said to 
have been: 'Nayawa jiwtxa, nayjarusti waranqa waranqaranakawa 
kutanipxa - I die, but I shall return tomorrow as thousands and 
thousands.' His brief successes against the Colonial powers and his 
prophecy of return continue to fire the imaginations of many today. 
Tupaq Katari is not dissimilar to King Arthur, the once and future king, 
who will come again to eject the invader and return things to their natural 
order.46 The language of this return is that of the pachakuti, which can be 
resulted in the leader of the MRTKL, Victor Hugo Cardenas becoming Vice-president. 
Jenaro Flores (FULKA), Fdlix Cardenas (Eje Pachakuti) and Fernando Untoja (MKN) 
were the other katarista candidates. The Eje Pachakuti was the only one of these to 
obtain enough votes for a seat in Parliament. See Xavier Alb6 'And from Kataristas 
to MNRistas? The Surprising and Bold Alliance between Aymaras and Neoliberals in 
Bolivia', in Donna Lee van Cott (ed.), Indigenous Peoples and Democracy in Latin America 
(New York, I994), p. 67. For a discussion of the evolution and splits that engendered 
many of these groups, see Javier Hurtado, El Katarismo and Diego Pacheco, El 
indianimso y los indios. 
42 The revolt was actually started much further south by Tomis, Nicolas and Damaso 
Katari from whom Julian Apaza took the name to signify the unity of the movement. 
See Victor Hugo Cardenas, 'La lucha de un pueblo' in Xavier Alb6 (ed.), Razces de 
America- El mundo aymara (Madrid, 1988), p. 502. The kataristas were also variously 
led by Julian's wife, Bertolina Sisa, and sister, Gregoria Apaza, both of whom also 
took the name Katari and are well-remembered today. 
43 Javier Hurtado, El Katarismo (La Paz, i986), p. i8. 
44 Felipe Qhispe Wanka, Tupak Katari Vivey Vuelve... iCarajo! (La Paz, 1990), pp. I40-3. 
It should be noted, however, that not all katarista groups are equally anti-Christian, in 
particular not those who seek success in mass electoral politics. 
45 Bartolina Sisa, his companion and leader of the army, continued the struggle until she, 
too, was captured the following September, when she was hanged and quartered. 
46 In Peru the parallel phenomenon is that of 'Inkarri', the Inka king. Inkarri's body is 
also believed to be growing underground or hiding in the jungle waiting for his 
triumphant return. See, for example, A. Flores Galindo, Buscando un Inca: identidady 
utopia en los Andes (La Habana, I986). 
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translated as the turning of the earth - literally, a revolution. But 'kuti' 
can also be translated as return and in this sense it refers to the return of 
Tupaq Katari and the values of the earth, 'pacha'.47 All over the northern 
altiplano one can see graffiti proclaiming that he still lives and will return. 
The language is strikingly similar to that of the evangelical Christians who 
proclaim that Jesus lives and who announce the second coming. 
Although katarismo is a multifarious and somewhat inchoate movement, 
it taps into sentiments that stress a return to 'traditional' Aymara religion, 
a relationship with the pre-Inkaic and putatively Aymara civilisation of 
Tiwanaku, and the rejection of those elements of Western culture seen as 
oppressive and contrary to the basic tenets of the Aymara way of life. The 
political aim of this movement is the empowerment of Aymara groups on 
their own terms, and eventually political power on a national scale. 
'Katarismo is the recuperation of "long memory" obscured by the short 
memory of the Agrarian Reform'.48 
Katarismo has created what has hitherto never existed, a sense of an 
Aymara nation. Historically in the Andes, polities such as the Inka and 
Tiwanaku empires have been multilingual and multi-cultural. In 
contemporary Bolivia some very small ethnic groups may speak two 
languages and many other radically distinct groups may share a language. 
The idea of an 'Aymara nation', as in all other cases,49 is rooted in a 
mixture of historical fact and contemporary invention. What the kataristas 
have discovered, as have other Latin American indians,50 is that the 
language of nationhood is a coherent way of making the political elites 
recognise their concerns: economic and social issues are forcefully 
expressed through the language of nationhood and historical injustice. 
It is important to note that the definition of'nation', used here is not 
that in the sense of Gellner51 or Anderson52, who see it specifically in 
terms of the nation-state, but rather more broadly as the political action 
of a group which recognises itself as ethnically distinct. It is not necessary 
for this kind of nationalism to argue for a separate nation state. Whereas 
47 Pacha in Aymara is a highly evocative term and there is no room here to go into it in 
great detail but pacha is also the site of the tellurian deities to whom much indigenous 
ritual is directed. The pachakuti then is also the elevation of the indigenous nature gods 
to a position of hegemony as opposed to the domination by the sky gods of God the 
Father, Jesus and so on. 
48 Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, ' Oppressed but not Defeated': Peasant Struggles among the Aymara 
and Quechua in Bolivia, I900-1980 (Geneva 1987), p. i63. 
49 Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge, 
1982). 
50 See, for example, Joanne Rappaport, The Cumbe Reborn (Berkeley, 1994). 51 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, 1983). 
52 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of 
Nationalism. (London, I983). 
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many do, many others, such as the Zapatistas and most kataristas, do not. 
Nationalism can be minimally defined by the belief that 'it is proper to 
expect from certain groups a specific sense of solidarity in the face of other 
groups'.53 Weber stresses the normative aspect of this sense of nation. It 
is in this insistence that it is right and proper to see Aymaras as a distinct 
group that the multifarious katarista groups have had considerable 
success. That is, although katarista groups have not achieved great success 
in formal political terms, it is not the case that they have been unable to 
influence political agendas. 
The first independent national peasant confederation, the 
Confederaci6n Sindical Unica de Trabajadores de Bolivia, rose in the 
Aymara region out of the katarista movement in 1979, and was an 
important source of resistance to the dictatorship of Garcia Meza 
(I980-I982).54 The kataristas of the CSUTB, in regarding the peasantry 
not only as a class but also as an ethnic group, were strongly critical of 
some of the tenets of the 19 5 2 Revolution. They were able to give political 
expression to the wide feeling or frustration and resentment in rural areas 
born of decades of manipulation and co-option by party and state.55 At the 
same time, they were keen to maintain the syndicalist structure of peasant 
organisation even while they attempted to make it more representative of 
and responsive to the ethnic reality of its members. 
If the advent of constitutional democracy as well as internecine strife 
damaged the kataristas in the second half of I98os, the I990S saw indian 
political demands making their way onto the national agenda. Even as the 
katarista movement split into ten parties, many of its proposals for a 
multinational state had been gaining broader support, partly in response 
to the national and international crisis on the left.56 Especially since the 
march of thousands of indians to the capital in I992, it has become 
increasingly clear to many non-indian Bolivians that the indian is not 
simply going to go away. The March for Territory and Dignity, which 
began in the eastern lowlands, comprised twelve ethnic groups who 
travelled 700 kilometres through the jungle and high Andean passes to the 
capital city, La Paz, where they were met by thousands of highlanders, 
many wearing ponchos and waving the multicoloured wiphala flag, the 
banner of the indian nation. The arrival of thousands of indians in the city 
rekindled old memories of the siege of La Paz by Tupaq Katari two 
53 Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley, 1978), p. 922. 54 Juliana Str6bele-Gregor, 'Cultura politica de los aymaras y los quechuas en Bolivia. 
Acerca de las formas aymaras y quechuas en relacionarse con la modernidad', in Max 
Peter Baumann (ed.), Cosmologiay musica en los Andes (Mexico, I996). 
55 Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, 'Democracia liberal y democracia de ayllu', p. 26. 56 Xavier Alb6, 'And from Kataristas to MNRistas?', p. 6I. 
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hundred years previously,57 memories of siege, starvation and death that 
still strike a highly emotive chord for many creole and mestizo Bolivians.58 
Whereas, up to the early I990s, political parties made no concession to 
indian demands, today the current political discourses of the major parties 
stress the multicultural nature of Bolivian society. An important 
ideological space has been open up for celebrating difference, for valuing 
subaltern cultures in their own terms. This is partly, one supposes, in 
response to the pressure from populist parties such as Conciencia de la 
Patria (CONDEPA) in the city of La Paz which eloquently articulated the 
issues of marginalisation, racism and urban poverty and achieved various 
election successes in the late i98os and nineties.59 Even though led by the 
white 'Compadre' Palenque, CONDEPA was clearly directed at recent 
indian migrants to the city and even though Palenque's television 
programme was transmitted in Spanish, the Spanish spoken was 
frequently an 'Aymarised' Spanish. CONDEPA, according to Strobel- 
Gregor, is in part an expression of a burgeoning urban Aymara identity 
although it expresses this identity in a rather unclear and diffuse way.60 
A much clearer and forceful expression of an Aymara consciousness is 
presented in the figure of Victor Hugo Cardenas, the katarista Vice- 
president from 1993 to I997.61 He wielded little power and exercised but 
moderate influence; the very fact of his presence in such a high office, 
however, may have changed the way indians are regarded in Bolivia. In 
particular, it was notable that he was in a coalition with the MNR 
(Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario) which led the national revolution 
in I952 and had long been a vigorous advocate of the homogenous 
nation-state. Campaigning for the 1993 election, the leader of the MNR, 
Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, talked of Bolivia as a 'nation of nations' a 
formulation which would have been unacceptable to the MNR four years 
previously.62 
At the time of the election there was much talk of Cardenas, his 
electoral address in Aymara, Quechua and Guarani,63 and the fact that his 
57 Ibid. 
58 It is not only in the distant past that indians have rebelled or laid siege to the city. There 
have been several uprisings this century and in 1979 Aymara miners and peasants 
successfully blockaded the city of La Paz for several days in protest at the military coup. 
59 Juliana Strobele-Gregor, 'Busqueda de seguridad y formas proprias de afirmaci6n de 
la identidad social aimara urbana', America Indzgena, vol. 3 (1992), pp. I65-77. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Victor Hugo Cardenas, 'La lucha de un pueblo'. Cardenas leads the MRTKL, the 
Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaj Katari de Liberaci6n. 
62 Xavier Alb6', 'And from Kataristas to MNRistas?', p. 56. 
63 Cardenas was not only concerned with Aymara peasants. In 1993 he and the MRTKL 
assisted the Asamblea del Pueblo Guarani, a lowland indian organisation, in gaining a 
seat in parliament. 
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wife, Dofia Lidia, still wore traditional indian dress. One upper-class 
white Bolivian half-jokingly commented to me that now when she was 
driving through certain areas of the capital city she had to be more careful 
because one of those cholas she almost knocks down could be the vice- 
president's wife! In this way she and Cardenas, in the own persons, may 
have made some kind of a dent in the historical 'fact' that indians are, by 
definition, people of low status and marginal to Bolivian society. 
Another of the important recent gains for indians inspired by katarista 
efforts is that La Paz is now officially a bilingual city, and citizens have the 
right to be addressed in Aymara as well as Spanish. Obliging functionaries 
to speak Aymara and having Aymara-speakers hear their language in an 
official capacity can only raise the status of the language and its speakers 
and undermine the notion of the mestizo Spanish-speaking nation. 
Katarismo arose out of the landscape created by the I952 Revolution 
and its aftermath. The economic, political and cultural changes that 
occurred during this period repressed and assimilated indian culture in 
accordance with government policy. Nevertheless, these same changes 
produced an educated and vociferous class of activists with enough 
symbolic capital to challenge state ideology at its very roots. The post- 
195 state educated indians, improved communications and oversaw mass 
migration to the cities. It was also officially blind to the systemic racism 
at the very root of state ideology. As a result, the frustration of rural 
disadvantage and indian marginalisation became most coherently articu- 
lated in terms of the demands of an indian nation, an ethnically distinct 
group with certain rights within the state. That is, what might have been 
expressed in terms of problems of rural underinvestment or urban 
deprivation were seen as 'indian' issues because the state had for so long 
denied that there was an 'indian issue' at all. Katarismo in its various forms 
was able to articulate a whole range of issues, urban and rural, political 
and domestic, economic and religious, because people continued to be 
disadvantaged on account of their ethnic and racial identities. By ignoring 
difference and holding to naive ideologies of assimilation, the state 
allowed a strong sense of alienation and rejection to be felt by a large 
number of people - urban and rural, educated and uneducated - as they 
encountered metropolitan culture. Katarismo in its various forms was able 
to articulate the despair and frustration of many people through the trope 
of the indian nation. 
Tupaq Katari is invoked by a variety of groups. Some, such as the 
Ayllus Rojos and the EGTK, are militant groups campaigning for an 
Aymara nation-state, others, such as the MRTKL, have their roots in 
social movements that seek to further the interests of indians within the 
existing nation-state, others still are myriad groups who use his name as 
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a mark of ethnic distinction and resistance. There are considerable 
differences between these groups, a full discussion of which is beyond the 
scope of this article, but there is an important sense in which they all share 
fundamental assumptions about the position of indians in Bolivia.64 They 
share an indianist discourse based on demands, which insists on seeing 
indians as sharing group rights (and injustices) rather than as individual 
citizens in a liberal nation state. To let off a bomb in the name of Tupaq 
Katari, or to name a woman's group after Bartolina Sisa is to articulate the 
distinctive nature of Aymara identity. This language of ethnic difference, 
whether spoken loudly or softly, has had an important effect on how 
Bolivians in general understand their nation and its composition. 
Over time, the political party that has dominated electoral politics since 
1952 has come full circle. From being the apotheosis of a party advocating 
a homogenous nation-state and pursuing policies with the expressed aim 
of deracinating indians, it has become the first important political player 
to express an idea of the nation that is multi-cultural and ethnically 
complex, and, most importantly, likely to stay that way. The ideology of 
mestiaaje has given way to the ideology of multiculturalism; hybridity has 
been replaced by heterogeneity. An important part of this impulse to 
change has been the version of katarismo espoused by Cardenas, which he 
has taken to the centre of national government. Cardenas' katarismo 
asserts difference, but at the very centre of national power, and has thus 
managed to reverse the traditional position of indians in the ideology of 
the nation-state from one of 'abstract inclusion but concrete exclusion' to 
one of abstract exclusion but concrete inclusion,65 for as it seeks to assert 
a distinct identity for indians it also introduces indians into the political 
process as players in their own right.66 
Indigenous movements, however, are not the only challenge to the 
homogenous mestizo nation-state. For five centuries, religion has been 
used to conquer, incorporate and unify a disparate society and nation. 
Catholicism, however perfunctorily practised, united all Bolivians in 
Christian civilisation, even as some were deemed more 'civilised' than 
others. Catholicism's cosmopolitanism, in that for centuries it attempted 
to assimilate local cultural practices into its own,67 is concordant with the 
64 For a general discussion on katarista groups and their various unions and divisions, see 
Hurtado, El Katarismo. 65 See Guillermo Bonfil, (ed.), Utopiay revoluci6n. 66 I am indebted to one of the anonymous reviewers of JLAS for this observation. It is 
worth pointing out, however, that other katarista groups see Cardenas' willingness to 
engage with state institutions as a total betrayal. 
67 David Lehmann, Struggle for the Spirit: Religious transformation and popular culture in 
Brazil and Latin America, (London, 1996), p. 8. For an excellent Andean example of the 
Church's assimilation of indigenous practice see Sallnow's account of the cult of 
Q'oyllur Rit'i in Peru, Michael Sallnow, Pilgrims of the Andes (Washington, D.C., I987). 
Sabine MacCormack, Religion of the Andes (Princeton, I991) provides a thorough 
This content downloaded from 86.182.194.4 on Sun, 20 Jul 2014 18:35:29 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Contesting Hybridity 13 
ideology of mestigaje which attempted to assimilate indians into the nation. 
Both had as their goal a model of Western civilisation, if not quite the same 
model, and both sought to achieve this goal by absorption. Whereas 
katarismo has undermined the homogenising effects of ideological 
mestiZaje, evangelismo has undermined the homogenising efforts of 
established Catholicism. 
Evangelismo 
The growth of evangelismo, evangelical Protestantism, also needs to be 
understood in terms of the cultural and economic landscape of post- 
revolutionary Bolivia. Institutional Catholicism was tightly bound to the 
hacienda system, and when the Agrarian Reform effectively abolished the 
hacienda system, the power of the Catholic Church concomitantly 
declined in rural areas. At the same time, rapid urbanisation and economic 
change put new pressures on rural people and migrants; pressures, it 
seems, that evangelical groups understood far better than their Catholic 
counterparts. These are the same pressures - of rapid change, dislocation 
and indeed racism- that produced the passion behind katarismo. 
However, in evangelismo, these pressures found a quite different resolution. 
Even though Protestant groups have been active in Bolivia since the 
turn of the century - when the Catholic Church was disestablished - they 
made very modest gains in the first half of the century, despite sustained 
and even heroic efforts. By 1931 there were 17 Protestant missions in 
Bolivia, although by this time there was open opposition against 
Protestantism,68 which had its effect on recruitment for several decades. 
During this period several groups, in particular the Seventh Day 
Adventists, continued to open schools and teach indians in the face of 
official and often violent opposition.69 Even though they earned much 
respect, their numbers remained small. In 95 o the Adventists, the largest 
evangelical group in Bolivia, had only two thousand members. Since then 
the numbers have multiplied several fold. Today approximately ten 
percent of the Bolivian population is evangelical,70 but they are not evenly 
analysis of the process of evangelisation in the Andes at the time of European conquest 
and colonisation and the manner in which indigenous religious forms were 
incorporated into Andean Catholicism. 
68 Carlos Intipampa, Opresion y Aculturaci6n: La evangelizacion de los Aymara, (La Paz, 
I991), p. 136. 
69 Juliana Str6bele-Gregor, Indios de piel blanca. Evangelistas fundamentalistas en Chukiyawu 
(La Paz, I989). 
70 The 1992 census had five categories under religious affiliation: cat6licos, evangelicos, 
otras religiones, ninguna, sin especificar; that is, Catholic, Protestant, other religions, 
none, did not specify. 
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distributed. According to the 1992 census,71 the department of La Paz has 
35 per cent of all evangelistas compared to 30 per cent of total population. 
Most of these reside in the provinces of the northern highlands.72 The 
dramatic growth began after the I952 Revolution. The Seventh Day 
Adventists quintupled their numbers in the following decade.73 This 
growth continued through the sixties and not only occurred in long- 
established churches such as the Adventists, but also later arrivals such as 
the Assemblies of God, which, after arriving in I957, was very soon 
exhibiting the dramatic growth rates of the other churches.74 During this 
period of expansion, as before, missionaries concentrated on the Aymara- 
speaking indians. They were correctly identified as the most vulnerable 
sectors of the population, and the most amenable to conversion. 
During the 95 os and 6os, at the time that the Protestants were offering 
indians education and new forms of community and spiritual life, the 
Catholic Church was facing an important crisis from which it has arguably 
never recovered. The rise of Protestantism must be seen in the context of 
the decline in power and influence of the Catholic Church. Since the 
Conquest, the Catholic Church has been highly successful in allying itself 
with the state, and indeed acting almost as an organ of the state. 
Catholicism was not incidental to the Spanish conquest of America; it 
provided the moral justification.75 The Spaniards, moreover, were 
accustomed to seeing religion as a hegemonic tool since they had just 
finished a centuries-long war against the Muslims in Spain, the Reconquista, 
in which religion was used to justify the wars as well as providing a banner 
around which to rally support. Thus, when the Spanish arrived in the 
Andes, the politics of conquest and Catholicism had become inextricably 
linked and the concomitant subordination of religion to politics ensured 
that 'Catholicism in the Andes was to become first and foremost a 
mechanism of political and social control and only secondarily an ethical 
and spiritual teaching'.76 By the middle of the twentieth century the 
Catholic Church was still quite clearly a pillar of the establishment and 
supported the land-owning oligarchy. For example, one ageing mestizo 
resident of a small town bemoaned the fact that thirty years ago the priest 
71 Ministerio de Planeamiento y Coordinaci6n/Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Censo 
nacional de poblaciony vivienda 1992. Resultados Finales (La Paz, 1993). 
72 Murillo, Omasuyos, Pacajes, Camacho, Larecaja, Franz Tamayo, Ingavi, Loayza, 
Inquisivi, Los Andes, Aroma, Manko Kapac. The exception here is the jungle province 
of Pando which has a population which is 3 .47 per cent evangelical out of a total 
population of under 5,ooo, and Gualberto Villaroel with 23.05 per cent out of a 
population of under I2,000. 
73 Quentin Nordyke, Animistic Aymaras and Church Growth, (Oregon, I972), p. 137. 
74 Ibid. 75 Anthony Pagden, The Fall of Natural Man (Cambridge, i982), p. 3. 76 Michael Sallnow, Pilgrims of the Andes, p. 50. 
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could rely on the police to ensure indians' attendance and contributions 
to religious fiestas whereas now attendance was voluntary. Similarly it was 
the hacienda-owner who brought the priest to visit the communities and 
obliged people to attend mass. Moreover, Catholicism was, and frequently 
is, seen as the natural religion of Bolivia.77 
The Catholic institutions supported the agrarian oligarchy against the 
Liberals and were resistant to change in the status quo. In the 1930S, for 
example, the Church angrily denounced liberal reforms that provided for 
modest education for indians on the grounds that they would be 
corrupted. At the same time, the priest could sometimes function as an 
intermediary between indian communities and the hacienda-owner. 
On the other hand, despite being very politically conservative, the 
Church was rather relaxed when it came to imposing its orthodoxy on 
indians. Since the mid-seventeenth century, when it gave up its campaign 
known as the Extirpation of Idolatries, the Church had become quite 
tolerant of indigenous religious practice. So long as the formal language 
was Christian, non-orthodox practices such as animal sacrifice or the 
invocation of pagan deities were tolerated. This is a mark of the 
cosmopolitanism of the Catholic Church,78 but it is also perhaps a mark 
of the lack of engagement with its flock. This problem reflects the very 
small number of priests, and the even smaller number who spoke Aymara 
or Quechua, the native tongues of the majority of Bolivians until very 
recently. 7 
However, by the fifties and sixties the Catholic Church was becoming 
increasingly uncomfortable with its support of authoritarian elites. As the 
liberalisation in Europe and North America filtered through, the Catholic 
Church in Latin America turned its focus to the spiritual and practical 
needs of the masses, its 'preferential option for the poor'. In Bolivia, with 
the dismantling of the mining and agrarian oligarchy, the Catholic Church 
was unable as well as unwilling to fulfil the social role it had so 
successfully occupied for centuries. As it sided more and more with the 
poor and powerless it also progressively lost the political clout to deliver. 
In any case, by the 1970S many rural communities were rarely if ever 
77 In 199 I, for example, the bishop of La Paz announced on radio that Protestantism with 
its North American association and values was alien to Bolivia. Catholicism, he said, 
was the religion that most fully corresponded to the life and culture of Bolivia. The 
irony that it was the conquering Spanish who brought Catholicism to Bolivia escaped 
him, and it escaped him because, like most Bolivians of his class, he has a vision of 
Bolivian identity that necessarily includes a Spanish heritage. For him, as for many 
others, Catholicism is Bolivia's religion. 
78 David Lehmann, Strugglefor the Spirit. 
79 It was not until 1992 that a census showed a majority of Bolivians as having Spanish 
as their first language. 
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visited by a priest,80 and so the Catholic Church had neither the personnel 
nor the resources to achieve its aims. In contrast, Protestant groups were 
able to send hundreds or perhaps even thousands of pastors into areas 
where there were but a couple of priests. 
While it takes at least seven years of higher education to make a 
Catholic priest, Protestant pastors frequently need little formal training 
beyond being able to read the bible. Whereas Catholic priests were few 
and often foreign-born, these pastors and missionaries were much more 
frequently from the same social and cultural background as those they 
were attempting to convert and, at a time when traditional social and 
economic structures were changing rapidly, they were better able to 
provide spiritual succour and new forms of community life. In particular, 
evangelical pastors found their message was received best among those 
people whose lives were changing most dramatically as metropolitan 
life impinged more and more on them, often finding themselves caught 
between a 'traditional' culture and a dynamic Western one. 
Over the post-revolutionary decades many indians migrated to the 
capital city, but maintained important links with their communities that 
were often only a few hours' travel away. Many, then, found themselves 
riding between two worlds and subject to the stresses of social, cultural 
and economic dislocation.81 Protestant groups consciously exploit the 
disorientation and dislocation of recent migrants, being well aware that it 
is in the period when migrants first arrive in the city that they are most 
vulnerable, and most in need of the support and sense of community that 
membership of a small and dedicated group can bring.82 
In those rural settlements that are not evangelical, a system of religious 
cargos, communal rituals and fiestas bind the community together. 
Communal solidarity and identity are created through ritual. Patronal and 
agricultural feasts, first hair-cuttings,83 deaths, wakes and many other 
ritual events are celebrated on a community basis, usually through sharing 
alcohol, coca leaves and food. In addition many of these feasts require 
sponsorship from a married couple. The couple and their kin, fictive and 
80 In one community where fieldwork was conducted in the 1990s, the priest visited once 
every two or three years. This is by no means atypical, and remoter communities may 
never see a priest at all. 
81 X. Alb6, T. Greaves and G. Sandoval, Chukiyawu: La Cara Aymara de La Pat. Vol iii: 
Cabalgando entre dos Mundos (La Paz, I983). 
82 Juliana Stribele-Gregor, Indios de Piel Blanca; Juliana Str6bele-Gregor, 'Las comuni- 
dades religiosas fundamentalistas en Bolivia: Sobre el exito misionero de los Adventistas 
del Septimo Dia', in Allpanchis vol. 40, (1992), pp. 219-53; Andrew Canessa, 
'Evangelical Protestantism'. 
83 The first hair-cutting, rutucha, is an important ritual undertaken when a child is about 
8 months to two years old. It is attended by the entire community, who welcome the 
child as a member. 
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real, will spend considerable amounts of their money and agricultural 
products and, as a consequence, the cargo system serves to distribute 
resources from the wealthier to the poorer members of the community, 
since it is the wealthier people who are chosen as sponsors. Evangelistas 
reject all these offices and rituals as pagan,84 and it can be seen how being 
an evangelista in such a community would mean removing oneself from a 
wide range of social ties. Bernardo Guerrero has documented the manner 
in which Aymara communities in northern Chile are riven with strife as 
they go through the process of conversion to Protestantism.85 It is quite 
clear that a mixed community is a virtual impossibility for any length of 
time in these small rural settlements.86 
In this context it is important to note that it is the churches of what can 
be described as the third Protestant reformation that are by far the most 
numerous.87 It is not the older churches of the first reformation, the 
Anglican, Lutheran or Presbyterian churches that were able to exploit the 
disestablishment of the Catholic church; nor was it the Baptists and the 
Methodists (although they have had greater success than the churches of 
the first reformation); but the churches which by and large were founded 
in the United States in the last century, churches which can be described 
as spiritualist, fundamentalist and frequently ecstatic. These evangelical 
and fundamentalist churches are much less likely than their co-religionists 
of the historically more established churches to take an accommodating or 
relativistic view of what they consider pagan practices. They most 
certainly do not take the accommodating view of Roman Catholicism to 
variations from what they see as Christian orthodoxy. Whereas the 
Catholic Church moved from regarding local pagan practice as idolatry in 
the first hundred and fifty years of colonisation to regarding such practices 
as 'harmless superstition' by the middle of the seventeenth century,88 in 
more recent years Roman Catholicism has positively embraced local 
practice. What were previously tolerated as syncretic forms of religiosity 
are now regarded as 'inculturated' forms of the true faith.89 As a I992 
84 See, for example, Carlos Intipampa, Opresionj Aculturacion, p. 139 and passim. 
85 Bernardo Guerrero, A Dios rogando... Los pentecostales en la sociedad aymara del norte grande 
de Chile (Amsterdam, 1996). 86 See also Carlos Intipampa, Opresiony Aculturacidn, pp. I65-9. 87 David Martin, Tongues of Fire. 
88 The extirpation of idolatry can be said to have ended by the time Pefia Montenegro 
published his manual for priests in 66 . The fervour for extirpation was by now spent. 
Possibly, argues Pierre Duviols, because the most obvious examples of idolatry had by 
then disappeared and most parish priests were tired of the strife and conflict. See P. 
Duviols, La lutte contre les religions autochtones dans le Perou colonial. 'L'extirpation de 
'idolatrie' entre Ifa2 et I66o (Lima-Paris, I977). 
89 It appears that it is not only in the Catholic Church that 'traditional' Andean religion 
is regarded as an inculturated form of Christianity. Carlos Intipampa, for example 
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CELAM document attests,90 the Church recognises that in the religion of 
the ancestors the 'seed of the Word' was already present in the faith of 
indigenous people, predisposing them to the discovery of 'the Creator in 
all his creation: the sun, the moon, mother earth, etc.'.91 Through such an 
understanding, all religious practices and beliefs are valid forms of 
Christian worship in a non-European cultural form. 
Among evangelical Protestants there is no such benign regard of 
indigenous religious practice, let alone a belief that the seed of the true 
faith resides in these practices. As Lehmann cogently points out, in 
Pentecostalism (and for Pentecostalism one can read other evangelista 
denominations) 
there is...no ritual developed from below, no unauthorised borrowing from 
other cultures, of the sort which for centuries has alternately met with grudging 
tolerance, co-optation or repression from the Catholic hierarchy. The dialectic 
between the erudite and the popular which lies at the heart of religious culture 
in almost the entire Latin Catholic world simply does not exist in Pentecostalism.92 
There are, to be sure, numerous differences between these Protestant 
churches - which number over 200 in Bolivia93 - and it is beyond the 
scope of this article to outline the numerous factions and distinctions. 
There are, nevertheless, a number of important common characteristics. 
One aspect of the successful Protestant churches is that they are all 
opposed to the consumption of alcohol and the chewing of coca.94 
Drinking and inebriation are central elements of cultural life across the 
Andes;95 they are acts of communion with the members of one's 
community but also with the tellurian spirits which sustain existence. 
Likewise, coca is central to life in the rural Andes and appears to have 
argues for this very interpretation, and even that Andean Christianity predates the 
European invasion, but his is an isolated voice and by no means representative, Carlos 
Intipampa, Opresidn y Aculturacidn. Intipampa recognises that the vast majority of 
Methodists in Bolivia have not even heard of the rather tame theology of liberation 
espoused by certain sections of the Bolivian Methodist hierarchy (ibid., p. 174) let alone 
his 'Andean theology', which owes so much to liberal Catholic commentators such as 
Xavier Alb6. One wonders what the consequences would be if Methodists did adopt 
this 'Andean theology', and how they could distinguish themselves from the liberal 
Catholics. 90 The Latin American Episcopal Conference. 
91 David Lehmann, Strugglefor the Spirit, p. 71. 92 Ibid., p. 17I. 
93 Carlos Intipampa, Opresidny Aculturacidn, p. I65. 94 There are some evangelistas who will chew coca, although without the reactive agent, 
llujt'a, which produces the narcotic effect (I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer of 
JLAS for this point). Other groups, such as the Mormons, are against any kind of 
stimulant whatsoever, even coffee which, in many altiplano communities, is a weaning 
food offered in a weakened and heavily sweetened form. 
95 Thierry Saignes, 'Borracheras andinas: ,porqu6 los indios ebrios hablan en espafiol?' 
Revista Andina (I989), pp. 83-119. 
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been for millennia.96 Coca chewing in the highlands is generally done in 
groups, with participants passing their coca pouches around so that all 
may share. The communal aspect of coca chewing is similar to the 
consumption of alcohol because it is emblematic of people relating to the 
spirit world as a community, an ethos that underlies life in many 
communities in the Andes.97 
Protestant groups are also opposed to other elements central to life in 
the Andes. Ritual co-parenthood, compadrazgo, is a Catholic institution 
adopted by many indigenous Andeans. Parents will seek as godparents for 
their child individuals who will assist the child in later life. Bonds between 
godparent and birth parent are very strong and they provide much mutual 
assistance for each other, assistance that can often mean the difference 
between destitution and survival in the vicissitudinous lives of Andeans. 
Evangelistas, however, reject compadrago as a pagan institution. 
Evangelistas then, are critical of the most fundamental aspects of indian 
rural life. At the same time they do provide individuals with an ethic many 
think more effective in a market economy. Freed from the burdensome 
obligations of sponsoring fiestas and demanding compadres, evangelistas 
can accumulate capital and enter into new, more fluid and short-lived, 
economic relationships.98 
Protestantism also provides an important defence against the kind of 
racism that indians confront as they leave their communities.99 Whereas 
in traditional communities an individual will have a position and a social 
status, once they enter the urban culture they are one of a mass of 'dirty 
indians', the lowest of the low. This racism is often phrased in terms of 
the distinction between civilised, urban, and Western, and uncivilised, 
rural and indigenous. Evangelical Christianity is seen as being 
quintessentially Western, more so than Catholicism, partly because the 
first missionaries all came from North America. Becoming a Protestant is 
96 Catherine Allen, The Hold Life Has: Coca and Cultural Identity in an Andean Community 
(Washington D.C., I988). 
97 Coca leaves are also used for offerings to the earth and mountain spirits and the seer, 
theyatiri, will cast leaves onto a cloth made from woven llama fibre to divine the will 
and knowledge of the chthonic beings. On a more practical level, coca is a mild narcotic 
which assists frequently undernourished people doing hard physical labour in the 
rarefied atmosphere of the altiplano which is at an altitude of 3,900 m above sea level. 
98 See Ted Lewellen, Peasants in Transition and David Martin, Tongues of Fire for this kind 
of analysis. 99 See, for example, Juliana Strobele-Gregor, 'Btisqueda de seguridad y formas proprias 
de afirmaci6n de la identidad social aimara urbana', and Olivia Harris, 'Ethnic Identity 
and Market Relations: Indians and Mestizos in the Andes', in 0. Harris, B. Larson 
and E. Tandeter, (eds), Ethnicity and Markets in the Andes: Indian Economies and Commercial 
Adaptations r6th-2oth Centuries, (Nebraska 1995), for accounts of the dispiriting and 
denigrating situation that many indians face living in the city, and some of the 
strategies to overcome this. 
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in many ways a social advance: by adopting evangelismo, indians can gain an 
element of superiority over their erstwhile Catholic, mestizo 'betters'.100 
One example of this is in fiestas described by Libbet Crandon-Malamud, 
where local Protestant indians can look down upon drunken mestizos and 
criticise them for their lack of control and sobriety.101 What is at play here 
is an appropriation of the stereotype of the 'drunken indian' which 
mestizos so often use. Thus, Protestantism is a means through which 
indians can overcome racism and become, in the words of Juliana 
Str6bele-Gregor, 'white-skinned indians'; in other words, becoming an 
evangelista is also a racial advance in a racially hierarchical society. That is, 
they do not simply seek an adaptation to the way of life of the white middle class, 
since the members of the middle class themselves recognise that they are but a 
poor copy of the original 'White Civilisation'. [The Aymaras] seek their identity 
in that very same 'White Civilisation', as the Adventists promise them and as 
they incarnate in themselves.102 
This article suggests that evangelical Christianity is partly an expression, 
not of defeat in the face of urban cultural superiority, but of a desire to 
gain cultural capital and status even higher than that of the dominant 
class.103 In this context, with the cultural hierarchy going from Western 
to indian with mestizos in the middle, evangelismo can be seen as leap- 
frogging from indian to Western, rejecting mestiqaje on the way. 
The association of evangelismo with a more advanced civilisation is 
evident in other areas too. Turco is a small expanding and ambitious town 
of the highlands which has been studied by Pauwels for many years. He 
found that the people recognise, both implicitly and explicitly, the 
incompatibility between the customs of old which were richer, more 
powerful and efficacious with regard to rain and fertility than those of 
today, and a desire for 'progress'. This is expressed in a nostalgia for the 
past and a feeling that 'we are finally becoming civilised'.104 Turco is 
exactly the kind of town where one would most expect to find the tension 
100 Bastide, working in Brazil, has noticed a similar aspect to Protestant conversion 
among Brazilian blacks: to the black, joining any Protestant denomination is in itself 
an advance. A cultural advance because Protestantism is the religion of the book and, 
therefore, of literate people. It is the religion of the United States, of a world power. 
A social advance because, on every level, the Protestant tends to rise and enter the 
middle class. Lastly, it is a religious advance. Roger Bastide, African Religions in Brazil: 
Towards a Sociology of the Interpenetration of Civilirations (Baltimore, I978), p. 372 in 
David Martin Tongues of Fire, p. 68. 
101 Libbet Crandon-Malamud, From the Fat of Our Souls: Social Change and Medical 
Pluralism in Bolivia (Berkeley, '99I). 
102 Juliana Strobele-Gregor, Indios de piel blanca, p. I89. 
103 Conversion can also expand social capital through the important networks that are 
opened up by church membership. 
104 Gilbert Pauwels, Dorpen en Gemeenschappen in de Andes: Socio-culturele Veranderingen bij 
de Boliviaanse Aymara (Leuven, 1983), p. 363. 
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between what is represented by old, autochthonous ways and modernism. 
There is much Protestant success in Turco, and Pauwels implies that part 
of the attraction of Protestantism is its uncompromising attitude to 
'heathenism'. Those who do not convert are frequently described as 
'underdeveloped' by evangelistas who clearly see themselves on the side of 
modernity and civilisation.105 
In a context of personal, economic and racial insecurity, evangelismo has 
provided a stable and coherent set of ideas and practices around which 
people can organise. These ideas are quite at variance with the 
cosmopolitanism of Roman Catholicism, and are equally antagonistic to 
the dominant ideology of cultural synthesis, mestizaje. Evangelistas shun 
this ideology, which embraces folkloric forms of indigenous practice as 
quintessentially Bolivian, such as the 'devil dances' of Carnival. Even 
though evangelismo developed in the wake of a great project that sought to 
integrate all aspects of the nation, evangelistas have rejected this (oppress- 
ively) inclusive model for one that marks difference. Moreover, they see 
religious and cultural compromise as inferior at best, if not absolutely 
degenerate and pagan. Almost 50 years after the Revolution, evangelistas 
are another group that has rejected some of its most cherished ideals. 
Evangelistas and Kataristas 
The previous sections have outlined the manner in which evangelismo and 
katarismo were formed in and by the landscape of post-revolutionary 
Bolivia. The movements both address some of the issues raised by the 
rapidly changing politic and economic scene, the dismantling of old hierar- 
chies and the introduction of market capitalism into the lives of people who 
were largely sustained by close communal organisations, even if some of 
them did spend periods of time in cities and in mines. What is also evident 
is that there is a perceived tension between Western-oriented modernisation 
and indian culture. Whereas katarismo seeks to deal with the tension by 
revitalising a (mythical) indigenous past, evangelismo implicitly and ex- 
plicitly embraces the Western model. Where kataristas and evangelistas 
agree is in rejecting the possibility of a middle ground. There is no reso- 
lution: evangelistas believe that pagan practices must be eradicated; 
kataristas reject many of the structures and ideas of Christianity. 
Kataristas are often uncompromisingly opposed to evangelistas. One 
such writes 'nos han impuesto una religi6n cat6lica apostolica y romana 
ayer; y hoy los gringos yankis de Norteamerica llegan y nos imponen 
tambien la religion evangelica'.106 It is thus that his organisation, the 
105 Ibid., p. 312 and passim. 
106 Felipe Qhispe Wanka, Tupak Katari Vivey Vuelve... jCarajo!, p. Io. 
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Ejercito Guerrillero Tupaq Katari has focused a number of its attacks on 
Mormon churches, even killing two Mormon missionaries. Mormons 
seem to have been targeted because they are, among the new religious 
groups, the most visibly American.107 At the same time, both katarismo 
and evangelismo reject the traditional middle way of cultural mestigaje and 
the manners and mores of the mestizo group which is socially and 
politically, if not numerically, dominant. 
Evangelismo and katarismo may thus be seen as parallel responses to some 
of the cultural, political and economic changes in Bolivia - attempts, 
perhaps, to construct their 'own modernity'.108 As such, their ideas have 
a structural similarity, if only in inversion. Hurtado argues that they are 
substitutes for each other.109 Furthermore, in areas such as the province 
of Aroma, considered to be the cradle of katarismo, he argues that there 
are very few evangelistas because katarismo has sufficiently revitalised indian 
culture to counteract the fissiparous tendencies of modern life. He 
mentions evangelismo in particular, since he sees it as offering a more 
individualist and anti-nativist response to modernisation.110 However, 
while Hurtado argues that katarismo and evangelismo are geographically 
distinct in their areas of greatest prevalence, the 1992 census reported the 
proportion of evangelistas in Aroma to be as high as 20.35 per cent 
(exceeded by neighbouring Los Andes with 22.87 per cent).1ll Hurtado 
is right in seeing the two phenomena as responses to the difficulties 
produced by change, and his insight that they are on a fundamental level 
incompatible is correct. His analysis cannot, however, explain why 
katarismo and evangelismo are strong and weak in the same areas. More 
research needs to be done in this regard but, as argued above, both 
movements offer complementary but radically different solutions to the 
same set of social and existential problems. They are complementary in the 
sense that they share a perspective on what they see as the current social 
and economic malaise of (in particular) indian people: they are radically 
different in that their solutions are diametrically opposed. What the data 
appear to indicate is that, given a situation where the religious and social 
status quo is being challenged, it is very difficult to predict which side 
people will take in rejecting it. 
107 Although not, strictly-speaking, Protestants, Mormons fall under the general category 
of evangelistas to most Bolivians. They are notable for their North American 
missionaries who are easily identifiable, not only by their features and stature, but by 
their crew-cuts, short-sleeved white shirts and dark tie. 
108 Juliana Strobele-Gregor, 'Cultura polftica de los aymaras y los quechuas en Bolivia', 
p. 510. 109 Javier Hurtado El Katarismo. 110 Ibid., p. 33. 
11 It is worth noting that this 20 per cent of the population almost certainly represents 
the great majority of church-going Christians, as attendance in Catholic mass is 
negligible, especially in indian areas. 
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Clearly, more work needs to be done on why a particular actor may 
choose one over the other. Interestingly enough, some of the founder 
members of the EGTK who targeted Mormons in their attacks were 
themselves once Mormons.112 There are other prominent kataristas who 
were evangelistas in their youth, and would prefer this not be made public. 
This suggests that evangelismo and katarismo are seen as alternatives from 
actors' points of view. Since there are many more evangelistas than 
kataristas it appears that once the middle ground is rejected most people 
opt for the route that takes them to a higher status, on the side of Western 
modernity rather than its poor copy, a mongrelised mestizo state. For 
others, in contrast, it may well be that the prospect of rejecting wholesale 
all the fundamental elements of indian culture is more than they can bear, 
so they opt for a vision of the world which raises the status of that culture. 
This process, however, may be more dynamic than might be thought in 
that it is evidently the case that some evangelistas become kataristas and it 
may be that the sense of dignity that evangelismo gives many people is 
indeed at the roots of their 'conversion' to katarismo.ll3 
What is much clearer, and important to recognise, is that both 
movements draw their greatest and most enthusiastic support from the 
same kinds of people: generally those with secondary and university 
education, and most frequently those who have either migrated to the city 
or have close connections with it. The freedom to travel and access to 
education are important benefits of the 1952 revolution, but it also 
exposed large numbers of people to the level of racial and social inequality 
in Bolivia, as well as providing the intellectual means to conceive of an 
alternative. This accounts for why it is the main public university of La 
Paz, the UMSA,114 as well as the small towns on the altiplano with good 
communications with the city, that are the great centres of katarista 
politics, rather than the remoter communities which more closely 
approximate the kind of cultural authenticity the kataristas are seeking. 
The similarities and contrasts between katarismo and evangelismo can be 
illustrated in the accompanying diagram. In some respects they are very 
112 David Knowlton, 'Mormons and terrorism in Bolivia', paper given at the Society of 
Latin American Studies Conference, York, UK (I996). 
113 See, for example, the case of Jaime in J. Strobele-Gregor, 'Wir sind die Indios mit der 
weiBen Haut', Wege gum Menschen, vol. 41, no. 2 (I989), p. 83. It may also be the case 
that the significant number of ex-evangelistas in katarista political organisations, despite 
the shunning of formal political action as worldly by many evangelistas, may be due to 
the fact that, in many rural areas, the only educated indians in previous generations 
were those educated by missionaries. See J. Strobele-Gregor, Indios de piel blanca, pp. 
274-5. This education provided them with the capacity for seeing beyond their 
condition in ways not open to others in what was then a highly regulated and 
repressive society for indians. 114 La Universidad Mayor de San Andres. 
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Evangelismo Katarismo 
*Accepts Western model of modernity A *Seeks to create an indigenous modernity 
*Rejects present for the future \ Looks to the past for the future 
*Pro Western education j \ Anti Western education 
*Anti-Pagan / Seeks to valorise local practice 
*Pro-Western / Anti-Western 
Christian Anti-Christian 
*Moralistic 
*Reject Hybridity 
Seek dignity for indians 
/ Reject cosmopolitanism 
*Reject cultural mestizaje 
*Undermine state ideology 
*Messianic figure at centre 
*Millenarian consciousness 
/Waiting for a resurrection and a new order 
*Oppose historical homogeneous nation-state 
Fig. i. Evangelismo and Katarismo. 
similar, whereas in others they are mirror images of each other. This 
suggests that even in their differences they have something in common. 
Whereas the one looks to models of the past and the other to the future, 
they both reject an unsatisfactory present. The katarista model of the past 
is moralistic and seeks to reinvigorate a demoralised and decadent indian 
people with the ethics of a bygone indian golden age. 'Don't steal; don't 
lie; don't be lazy' is one of the aphorisms most commonly seen, and is 
purported to be one of the tenets of Inka moral life. Evangelistas also see 
contemporary culture as decadent and provide a moralistic framework, 
not only in their avoidance of alcohol and coca, but in their stress on 
cleanliness and moral worth in general. Indeed, personal hygiene and self- 
respect is something both movements stress. Most significantly they 
clearly agree that there is a conspicuous lack of pride, dignity and self- 
worth among Aymara indians: they agree there is a moral deficit; they 
disagree on how to fill it. 
On many of the details there are also significant similarities. Both 
groups hold a second coming and a spiritual revolution as central tenets 
of their beliefs. The katarista graffiti in Achacachi and surrounding areas, 
' Tupaq Katari vive y vuelve!' is strikingly similar to the many signs 
heralding the advent of the Second Coming. The difference is that whereas 
in the katarista pachakuti revolution the autochthonous world of below 
will overcome the Christian world above and reign supreme,115 the 
115 Not all kataristas agree as to exactly what a pachakuti might entail. In his inaugural 
speech in 1993, Victor Hugo Cardenas stated that his election would mark a new 
pachakuti, not quite the indigenous upheaval imagined by others. Historically, a 
pachakuti has marked the (violent) turning of one age into another (see Therese 
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evangelista version will banish all paganism and herald a new era of 
Christian righteousness. At least, according to these graffiti it appears that 
the Second Coming or the pachakuti is imminent. 
Conclusion 
Indian nationalism and evangelical Protestantism have not, to date, been 
analysed together. This is partly because the social movement literature 
has ignored evangelical Protestantism, but also perhaps because they 
appear to occupy different realms of social life, making such a comparison 
counter-intuitive. Indeed, in seeking the 're-establishment of the pre- 
Hispanic order' and in focusing on ethnic identity, katarismo is clearly 
antithetical to the central ideas of contemporary evangelical Protestantism 
in Bolivia.l16 Similarly, in its hostility to 'paganism', evangelismo is frankly 
opposed to the revitalisation of Indian culture that the kataristas promote. 
Yet both phenomena have strong parallels: they both subvert the 
dominant national culture as it is presently constituted, and both 
endeavour to accord indians pride and respect in themselves. The Catholic 
Church and the Bolivian State are closely associated in the minds of many 
Bolivians.1l7 Protestantism, like katarismo can therefore become a focus of 
opposition to the dominant culture behind the state. 
Even though they are themselves examples of cultural hybridity they 
are clearly opposed to the established notion of hybridity, that is 
ideological mestigaje, which seeks to assimilate indians into a metropolitan 
culture which has underlined the Bolivian state since 952. In rejecting the 
cosmopolitanism of Catholicism and the syntheses of the state ideology, 
they seek, instead, essential and enduring categories of difference, eternal 
truths over compromises of the moment. 
Cultural compromise is clearly not working in the minds of many 
highlanders, and katarismo and evangelismo are, the article argues, responses 
to the recognition that Indian culture and Western Christian culture 
provide mutually incompatible strategies for a meaningful future. The 
compromise solution does not provide the self-respect and community 
structures that people need and desire, and even less does it provide them 
with a defence against systematic racism and marginalisation; quite the 
contrary, mestigaje provides indians with an unenviable position in an 
Bouysse-Cassagne and Olivia Harris, 'Pacha: en torno al pensamiento aymara', in T. 
Bouysse-Cassagne et al., Tres reflexiones sobre elpensamiento andino (La Paz, 1987), pp. 
i i-60. 
116 Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, 'Aymara Past, Aymara Future', NACLA Report on the 
Americas (1993), vol. 25, no. 3, pp. I8-23. 
117 Gilbert Pauwels, Dorpen en Gemeenschappen, p. 3 6. 
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obviously hierarchical system. The political idea of mestizaje has always 
included indian culture but, while glorifying the majestic indian culture of 
the past, it resolutely ignores the realities of an indian present.118 By the 
same token, while mestizaje is predicated on a positive view of racial 
mixing, it is biased to the whiter and more Western end of the spectrum 
of racial and cultural mixing.119 In a country such as Bolivia where at least 
half the population speaks an indian language, the consequences of such 
ideological positions are naturally profound and extensive. 
It is not surprising, then, that both katarismo and evangelical 
Protestantism are most prevalent in areas of greatest contact with the 
metropolitan culture, in those migrant communities in La Paz or the small 
towns with easy access to the big city. In those communities where 
communications with the metropolis are not as strong, both evangelismo 
and katarismo have yet to make serious headway.'20 
Whereas the extent to which katarismo has changed public perceptions of 
how the nation is constituted is relatively clear, the impact of evangelical 
Protestantism in this regard is perhaps more muted but remains, never- 
theless, significant. One of the curious things about evangelistas in Bolivia 
is that although they may not always be liked, they are widely respected 
as being honest, upstanding and industrious. Such indians may not behave 
in a stereotypical manner and may even possess a sense of moral super- 
iority over their erstwhile 'betters'. But, perhaps more generally, the 
presence of a significant proportion of the population which adheres to a 
faith other than Roman Catholicism undermines the cohesion of a national 
religion even if most people practise that national religion in a somewhat 
perfunctory manner. The assumption that people will unite in national 
celebrations based on religious themes by dancing and drinking can no 
longer hold, since so many evangelistas absent themselves from these. As 
such, despite the fact that they are notoriously apolitical, evangelistas have 
an important political effect. They provide another example of the nation 
being made up of heterogenous elements, of how the ideal of the culturally 
and racially unified nation state is illusory. 
In a region where hybridity has been a central feature of culture for 
centuries, the case of the northern highlands provides interesting examples 
of social movements which contest this hybridity and, moreover, do so 
quite explicitly. They provide a reminder that the globalisation of culture 
is resisted in often surprising ways. 
18 See Jane Hindley, 'Towards a Pluricultural nation'. 
119 Pete Wade, Race and Ethnicity. 
120 See Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, 'Democracia liberal y democracia de ayllu', for a 
complementary analysis of why katarismo has had such difficulty in gaining recruits in 
that most 'traditional' of highland areas, the Norte de Potosi. 
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